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Politics and policy changes in minority education in China: the case of Xinjiang 
Fei Yan and Geoff Whitty  
Introduction  
  The challenge of education for ethnic minorities, no matter which part of the world it is in, has 
always been an issue for governments as it is closely related to the ever pressing problems of social 
equality, social mobility, social cohesion and, more broadly, national identity. The provision of 
education might be an important way in which ethnic minorities can enhance both their personal and 
professional skills in the labor market, and consolidate their group identity and political status in the 
broader society. However, it could also be used by the State to establish social control over ethnic 
minorities by different or even opposite approaches such as assimilative and some versions of 
multicultural education, aiming to form a certain sense of nationhood, to create loyal or patriotic 
citizens and finally to maintain national unity. In most societies, both these tendencies are in evidence, 
as is a tension between them.   
Although China has often been seen as a homogeneous society with its 1.3 billion members sharing 
one culture (i.e. Confucianism) and speaking one language (i.e. Mandarin Chinese) (Hobsbawm, 1990, 
p.66), it is actually a multi-ethnic society, with the dominant ethnic Han group accounting for about 
91% of the total population and 55 so-called “minority ethnic groups” (shaoshu minzu) accounting for 
more than 100 million (about 9%) (Stats, 2010). Located in China’s far northwest corner and bordered 
by eight countries, Xinjiang, or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
1
 (XUAR), as it has 
officially been called in China since 1955, has a heavily multi-ethnic population. According to the 
official statistics, Xinjiang is home to 13 native ethnic groups, including 8.2 million Uyghur, 7.7 
million Han, and other ethnic groups whose populations range from 5,000 (Russian) to 1.4 million 
(Kazak). Among the 13 ethnic groups, seven of them are Muslim (including Uyghur), and five of them 
(including Uyghur) speak Turkic Languages. Meanwhile, Mandarin Chinese is widely used among the 
Han, Hui and Manchu ethnic groups in this region. Therefore, Xinjiang is seen as an especially 
multi-cultural and multi-lingual part of China
2
, although one in which one particular minority ethnic 
group – the Uyghur – predominates. 
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 Scholars such as Bovingdon (2004, 2010) argue that the creation of such “autonomous” regions within China 
does not grant real autonomy to minority ethnic groups and that, particularly in Xinjiang, it has actually 
contributed to minority ethnic unrest. 
2
 Xinjiang is also bordered by eight countries which are the Republic of Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. There are significant number of same ethnic groups living 
both sides of the border, e.g. Kazaks in both Kazakhstan and Xinjiang.  
In recent years Xinjiang has been experiencing a period of intensive ethnic tension which is 
evidenced by various “terror” attacks and violent inter-ethnic conflicts
3
. There is no doubt that Xinjiang 
is now becoming one of the country’s most politically sensitive region, arguably even more so than 
Tibet. Therefore, Xinjiang has become an important target of China’s nation building project. Indeed, 
since the Communist Party of China (CPC) first governed Xinjiang in1949, it has adopted different 
strategies to integrate this land and its people into the Chinese nation.  
 
So this chapter first reviews the general strategies adopted by the CPC government to integrate its 
minority ethnic groups and how these strategies have shifted in accordance with changes of political 
climate in the central government in Beijing. Four periods are identified in this chapter according to the 
dominant development strategies adopted by the central government - the Socialist period (1949 - 
1976), the Modernization period (1976 - 1989), the Patriotic period (1989 - 2008) and the Paradox 
period (2008 - present)
4
. It analyzes how particular education policies were adopted to support the aim 
of integration of minority ethnic groups in each of these periods. Important education policies such as 
“bilingual education” and the “in-land class system”
5
 are particularly examined since they are often 





We argue that, while these policies are presented as facilitating the integration of minority ethnic 
groups into Chinese society, in practice they do not always constitute genuinely multicultural education. 
In our view, this should entail intercultural dialogues that respect the cultural identities of all learners. 
Such an education also needs to provide them with the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to 
achieve full participation in society, while fostering respect, understanding and solidarity among 
individuals, ethnic, social, cultural and religious groups and nations (see UNESCO, 2006).  
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 More than 10 incidents described as “terror attacks” or “ethnic riots” took place in the five years up to 2014 and 
the number has escalated subsequently. In the most serious incident, which occurred on 5th July 2009, almost 200 
fatalities were reported. At least as significant are various forms of “everyday resistance” identified by Bovingdon 
(2010). 
4
 Periodization is not an exact science and some scholars prefer a two-phase periodization with a division in the 
mid-1970s. We anyway identify some shifts in education policy within these broad periods. Furthermore, different 
approaches to minority ethnic education often co-exist and there is sometimes a return to earlier forms as may be 
happening now. 
5
 “In-land” normally refers to the region between Chinese western border regions and eastern coast regions where 
Han are the main residents. The “in-land class” refers to a particular type of boarding school established mainly for 
minority ethnic students from Tibet and Xinjiang. The difference between a Han boarding school and an in-land 
class is that, whereas Han children are generally sent to board in the nearest urban center, “minority” students from 
Tibet or Xinjiang are sent to board in “Han” regions that are both geographically distant and culturally unfamiliar. 
It was believed that this system would help the government to overcome the obstacle of a scarcity of qualified 
teachers in minority regions and, at the same time, reduce the cost since it seemed cheaper to construct new 
schools in in-land than in Tibet where transportation was not so convenient (Wang and Zhou, 2003, p. 97). 
6
 The bilingual education is promoted across China’s minority ethnic regions, including many of regions in 
southwestern China6. The in-land class system is only adopted in the two most controversial minority regions, 
namely Tibet and Xinjiang. Both policies are an important part of the central government in Beijing’s strategy to 
integrate minority ethnic groups. 
Finally, based on the discussion of policies, this chapter will suggest what might be necessary to 
achieve genuine multiculturalism in the Chinese education system and potentially reduce ethnic tension 
in Xinjiang.  
  
The Socialist period (1949 - 1976) 
As a political party founded on the ideological base of Marxism-Leninism, and further developed 
by Maoist thought, it became imperative after the foundation of the PRC in 1949 for the CPC to spread 
its ideology to every part of China in order to legitimize its authority as well as consolidate its power 
over all people in China including both the majority Han and the ethnic minorities. To the Communist 
leaders, it seemed the most effective way that a united new China could be built was by unification of 
all Chinese people around a common Socialist ideology (Chen, 1981; Hawkins, 1978; Hu, 1974). 
Arguably, it was the first time in Chinese history that a rather civic idea of citizenship (Communism) 
was adopted, which at least in theory denies cultural discrimination and promotes equal relations 
among different ethnic groups in China. Indeed, according to the Article 53 of the Interim Constitution 
of PRC, a degree of local autonomy in ethnic minority regions was promoted and minority ethnic 
groups were supposed to have “freedom to develop their dialects and languages, and to preserve or 
reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs” (Dwyer, 2005, p.7). Based on this spirit, the 
CPC government aimed to establish a “a new governance and society”, designed to promote equal 
relationships between different ethnic groups including between the dominant Han and the various 
minority ethnic groups (ibid).  
  So in early years of the PRC (prior to 1956), the education policies that were adopted in minority 
ethnic regions were quite liberal and have thus been considered “admirable” (Dwyer, 2005, p.7), since 
minorities’ local conditions and their distinct cultures were taken into consideration (Bass, 1998; Bulag, 
2002; Hawkins. 1983). In fact, the CPC government offered two types of schools in minority ethnic 
regions such as Xinjiang. These were “nationality schools” (minxiao), which not only used the mother 
tongue as the medium for instruction but also provided specific curricula for minorities, including 
minority literature, history, etc, and Han schools (hanxiao), where minority ethnic students could learn 
in a Mandarin environment and study exactly the same curriculum as Han students. Thus, within an 
overall national education system, minority ethnic students were able to make their own choice of 
schooling
7
. Meanwhile, Han Chinese students in Xinjiang also had the option to study the Uyghur 
language as this would help them to work better in the region (Stites, 1999). Also, although most 
textbooks used by ethnic minorities were translated from Han Chinese books, some special working 
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 However, those who came through the “ethnic” stream would be effectively excluded from most fields of higher 
education (apart from the study of “minority” languages and cultures in “minority” colleges/universities). 
Therefore, in practice, choosing the “ethnic” option meant having less chance of joining the bureaucratic or 
technocratic elite. 
groups were set up to compile textbooks specifically for ethnic minorities in order to respond to their 
local needs and demands
8
 (Bass, 1998).  
This dual school system also reflected a plural language policy which, to large extent,  guaranteed 
minority ethnic groups the right to use their mother tongue in schools. In fact, the report of the first 
national conference on ethnic minority education held in 1951 claimed that “to ethnic minority groups 
which have developed their own writing script such as Mongol, Korean, Uyghur, Kazak and Tibetan, 
all the subjects in primary and secondary schools must be taught in their native language”
9
 (Wang, 
2003, p.27). So in early and middle 1950s, local languages were encouraged as medium of instruction 
in classrooms in Xinjiang. This language policy was seen as “responsive to local condition and 
arguably one of the more flexible in the world” (1. Executive summary). It was also claimed that this 
pluralistic language policy was “generally well received by ethnic minority groups” (Dwyer, 2005, 
p.x). 
However, things changed dramatically as a result of political struggles in the central Chinese 
government. During the Anti-rightist Campaign (1957-1958), Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), indoctrination of Maoist political ideology often became a national 
priority. The promotion of socialist ideology and class struggle led to a rejection of the cultures of 
different ethnic groups which, in turn, led to an almost exclusive focus on the idea of “ethnic fusion” 
(minzu ronghe) (Wang, 2003, p.30). As a result, elements of distinctive minority ethnic cultures, such 
as values, religions, customs, were seen to be against the supposedly culture-free ideology of 
Communism and they became objects of the “cultural” revolution and were all attacked and seen as 
needing to be “swept over”
10
 (Bass, 1998; Hawkins, 1978).  
It was against this background that education in minority ethnic regions became assimilative and 
the cultures of minority ethnic groups were re-interpreted within the education system. Schools for 
minority ethnic groups (minxiao) were forced to use Chinese as the medium of instruction, while the 
previous concessions that allowed culturally specific education for ethnic minorities were now 
abolished. Accordingly, in the education system, textbooks were rewritten again to consist almost 
entirely of socialist ideological content (Bass, 1998). In fact, characteristics of minority cultures were 
now typically condemned as “feudal” and were explicitly regarded as “backward and useless” (Wang, 
                                                          
8
 Bass (1998) also noted that in these textbooks, the minorities’ stories, mythological characters and historical 
figures were introduced.  
9
 The report also pointed out that to those groups which had not developed their own proper writing script, the 
government should help these groups to develop and reform their scripts and allow them to choose to use either 
their own language or Chinese in teaching (Wang, 2003, p.27). 
10
 It is observed that, in the periods between these political campaigns, there were effort to rectify mistakes in all 
areas including minority ethnic education. For instance, the mono-language policy was abandoned and ethnic 
minority languages were redressed as medium for instruction in schools in various ethnic minority regions (Wang, 
2003, p.27). 
2003, p.31). As a result of this mono-cultural and mono-linguistic approach to schooling, many ethnic 
minority students were still “illiterate” even after six or seven years in schools (ibid).  
  After the death of Chairman Mao, the CPC became increasingly aware that socialist ideologies alone 
were not capable of coping with either the aftermath of the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, or 
the new challenges posed by the need to improve the “material condition” (wuzhi tiaojian) of the 
Chinese people. The CPC therefore embarked on a shift of priority in national strategy, which would 
re-justify its legitimacy and authority. 
  
The Modernization period (1976 - 1980s) 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the most urgent task for the CPC was to develop the 
devastated economy and to achieve the aim of modernizing China. So in the reform period in 1980s, 
economics came to be regarded as rather more urgent than political indoctrination and became the new 
emphasis of China’s development strategy. Economic development, however, as seen by the CPC, 
could only be achieved by high quality human resources. Therefore, the CPC started to re-emphasize 
education as a means to create experts and mass produce productive laborers (Bass, 1998). The aims of 
education were now to be largely economically orientated and related to productivity and growth of the 
nation. 
The shift in national policy and ideology towards economic growth and the modernization of China 
under Deng's leadership also impacted upon the treatment of minority ethnic education in China. In 
1981, the “National Conference on Education for Ethnic Minorities” laid down a strategy for 
readjusting and developing minority ethnic education so that these sectors of society could help meet 
the industrialization and economic targets of modernization (Bass, 1998). Accordingly, some reform 
measures which were adopted widely across in-land China were also implemented in minority ethnic 
regions. These included the introduction of competitive public examinations (such as the gaokao - the 
national examination for university enrolment); the establishment of “key” schools; the expansion of 
basic education (at least at the beginning of the reform period); and the boarding school program, 
which was particularly promoted because a large percentage of the minority ethnic population lived in 
rural and remote areas of China (Bass, 1998; Hawkins, 1983; Murphy, 2004).  
Moreover, the CPC issued various policies specifically to upskill the minority ethnic labor force. 
For instance, minority ethnic students were given preferable treatment such as a lower minimum 
examination score to enter university. In 1984, a special “in-land class” (neidi ban) (a kind of boarding 
school) was established in secondary schools across in-land China for students from Tibet to enjoy free 
and high quality education (Bass, 1998; Postiglione, 2009; Zhu, 2007).  
The decrease of political indoctrination through socialist ideology in this period also relaxed 
constraints on the cultural expression of minority ethnic groups and provided more space for them to 
claim distinctive cultural identities. In 1984, two important laws were enacted - the “Nationality Law” 
and the “Regional Autonomy Law” - both aimed to protect minority ethnic groups’ rights to cultural 
autonomy. Therefore, in many ways, minority ethnic groups’ culture and their special needs were 
acknowledged and respected and it appeared that, during this period, many policies and practices 
towards minority ethnic groups reflected the spirit of multiculturalism.  
This multicultural spirit led to two major changes in education policies in minority regions such as 
Xinjiang. First, during the 1980s specific minority ethnic cultures were recognized in the education 
system and a local curriculum was initiated to respond to minority ethnic groups’ needs (Bass, 1998). 
For instance, traditional minority ethnic literature, which had been previously denounced as “feudal” 
and “backward”, was now reintroduced and taught in schools. Furthermore, several new unified sets of 
textbooks were also published and distributed in the 1980s, which included more specific information 
about the cultures of local ethnic minorities (Bass, 1998; Hawkins, 1983). Second, the new policies 
reaffirmed the right of minority ethnic groups to use their language in education system. This included 
the use of their mother tongue as medium for instruction in schools and the compilation and publication 
of textbooks in minority languages (ibid).  
Therefore, during this period, bilingual education was widely promoted in Xinjiang and the major 
model of schooling for minority ethnic students in Xinjiang was to use their mother tongue (such as 
Uyghur) in teaching of all subjects in primary and secondary schools except Chinese which was taught 
as a subject of second language
11
 (Wang, 2003, p.46). In other words, minority ethnic students were 
able to mainly use their mother tongue in schools until they reached university and college level. 
Research (ibid) shows that bilingual education in this period was generally welcomed since it helped 
minority students to become excellent in “both nationality and Chinese (language and culture)” 
(min-han jiantong) – producing a desired kind of person that the education system was trying to 
cultivate. 
However, the push for the improvement of education quality and the spirit of multiculturalism did 
not necessarily result in greater equity in education. The rhetoric of “modernization”, though sounding 
culture-free, still implied an unequal power relationship between Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese 
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 There were different models of bilingual education practiced in China during this period. In regions where the 
population was dominated by minority ethnic groups, minorities' mother tongue was prioritized in teaching 
throughout primary and secondary schools. It should be noted that even within this model there were differences in 
the starting age of learning Chinese as a second language: from grade three to six in primary school. In other words, 
schools could choose when to start to teach Chinese language in accordance with their needs (Wang, 2003, p.46). 
In other words, there was flexibility about the starting-age. In regions where Chinese was widely used by minority 
ethnic groups (such as urban settings), Chinese was prioritized and the minority ethnic group’s mother tongue was 
taught as a language subject. There was also a third model, which used both Chinese and the mother tongue of 
minority ethnic groups to teach different subjects (normally Chinese for science subjects and a local language for 
arts subjects) (ibid). 
groups since the former were regarded as the most advanced in terms of economic development, 
whereas most non-Han Chinese lived in less developed areas. Therefore, minority ethnic groups were 
often seen not only as “inferior” compared to the “superior” Han, but also as “backward” or as 
“vulnerable and in need of help, special consideration and advanced training from their more 
sophisticated and cultured Han brethren” (Hawkins, 1983, p.194). 
There was thus a tension in the policy between an apparent endorsement of the value of diverse 
cultures and a clear hierarchy among them, at least in terms of their perceived economic value. 
Although minority ethnic group identities were no longer largely suppressed in the relatively more 
tolerant political environment, they found that the “modernization” approach did not “solve the real 
problems of educational and economic inequity between China’s majority (Han) and numerous 
minorities” (Hawkins, 1983, p.200). While the “modernization” project and its related ideologies of 
“economic development” continue to be a state priority even until the present day, the CPC had to 
adopt new strategies in order to cope with the increasing resistance from minority ethnic groups.  
  
The Patriotic period (1989 - 2008)  
At the end of the 1980s, the rule of the CPC faced a serious threat resulting from a continuing 
decline of public faith in socialism. In order to regain legitimacy after the huge anti-government 
demonstration in Tiananmen Square, the CPC launched a “state-led systematic engineered project” to 
promote patriotism. This was referred to as the “Patriotic Education Campaign” (PEC) in official 
discourse (Zhao, 2004, p.238). The campaign was intended for all Chinese citizens of all generations, 
irrespective of their ethnicity or class and was an intensive undertaking by the CPC during the period 
1991 to 1994. Thereafter patriotism became one of the fundamental, intrinsic and core values 
propagated through the Chinese education system (He and Guo, 2000; Vickers, 2009; Zhao, 2004). 
Bass (2006, p.55) and Zhao (2004, p.219) pointed out that the teaching goals of the PEC in the 
education system were achieved particularly through instruction on China’s unique “long history, 
flourishing culture, and glorious tradition”, so that students could learn the “idea of the country” 
(guojia guannian) through the cultivation of strong national consciousness (Hughes, 2003; He and Guo, 
2000; Vickers, 2009; Zhao, 2004). As a result, there was a shift from the previous domination of a  
socialist narrative to a nationalist narrative, which now focused more on the distinctiveness of China. 
Subsequently, not only there was a renewed interest in themes such as “common ancestry” (i.e. the 
Yellow Emperor) in official and public discourse, but Confucianism, which had been heavily attacked 
during the Cultural Revolution, was now regarded as the soul of the Chinese culture and the foundation 
of the Chinese nation, which helped Chinese people to “guard the gates against western decadence” 
(He and Guo, 2000). 
 Meanwhile, in order to cope with the increasing separatist feelings among minority ethnic groups 
in Tibet and Xinjiang, the CPC government adopted an overriding ideology in order to manage 
inter-ethnic relations - “minzu tuanjie”, meaning “solidarity among nationalities”
12
 (Bulag, 2002, p.12). 
Under this ideology of “solidarity among nationalities”, the “multipleness” of China was now replaced 
by the focus on “oneness” and therefore minority ethnic groups’ distinctive cultures, which had been  
tolerated and even promoted in the education system in the 1980s, were once again denounced since 
they potentially led to multiple ethnic nationalisms
13
 (Zhao, 2004). Instead, links between minority 
ethnic groups and the “motherland” were strongly promoted in order to stimulate national sentiment 
among non-Han people. For example, cultural exchange and trade between Han and minority ethnic 
groups in history were emphasized whereas wars and conflicts between them were downplayed in 
history textbooks produced in this period
14
 (Baranovitch, 2010).  
Against this background, bilingual education and the in-land class system, both of which aim to 
integrate minority ethnic students in Xinjiang, experienced a massive expansion in the 1990s and 2000s 
(though both of the policies were initiated in 1980s). However, during this period, so-called bilingual 
education started to move away from a model that prioritized mother tongue of minority ethnic groups 
to a model that increasingly encouraged using Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction in 
schools in minority ethnic regions. Indeed, not only did the Chinese Ministry of Education (which was 
called the Education Commission then) announce a plan to implement a regular “Chinese competence 
test” (HSK)
15
 in all minority schools in 1992, but Chinese instruction now began in the first grade of 
primary school in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005, pp.33-37), much earlier than during the previous period. It 
seemed to some commentators that the government was aiming to make Mandarin Chinese the primary 
or sole language for instruction in all schools (Schluessel, 2007, p.257). 
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 Although “minzu tuanjie” had always been used in official rhetoric to regulate ethnic relations in China, its use 
has become more widespread now. In fact, as Bulag (2002) has claimed, “minzu tuanjie” has become an 
ideological framework that is used to define Han-minority relations. 
13
 Similar tensions between “multipleness” and “oneness” have been identified by Taylor-Gooby and Waite (2014) 
in the case of the UK, where a speech by Prime Minister David Cameron implicitly questioned multi-culturalism 
for creating social division and then asked commitment from different groups to a British national identity. It 
should be noted that in the case of the UK, multi-culturalism mainly refers to immigrant minorities who came to 
the UK in recent years, whereas in Xinjiang the largest ‘minority’ was the majority until relatively recently. Even 
now, the Han incomers are numerically in a minority, although economically, culturally and politically dominant. 
14
 Bulag (2002) also gave a vivid example that forced inter-marriages between Han and minority ethnic groups in 
history were now celebrated as implicit evidence of blood-links between them, although it had been condemned as 
humiliation to the Han Chinese in the previous period. 
15
 HSK (Hanyu shuiping kaoshi) was introduced by the Beijing Language and Culture University in 1990. It was 
the first standardized text for assessing the Chinese competence of non-native speakers. The test is clearly an 
imitation of the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL).The HSK test has been put to use largely for the 
assessment and “encouragement” of non-native speakers of Chinese (Dwyer, 2005, p.33). 
In 2000, the CPC also decided to extend the in-land class system to students from Xinjiang. The 
number of students enrolled for Xinjiang in-land classes has increased steadily from 1,000 in 2000 to 
5,000 in 2007 (GOV, 2013). The purpose of this initiative was to improve the quality of education and 
to produce a more skilled labor force for local economic development. But it should also be noted that 
this system had become strategically important for minority ethnic education as it also played a 
significant role in training patriotic minority ethnic students. In fact, in the MOE document of the 
“Regulation of the Xinjiang In-land Class”, “carrying on patriotic education” and “cultivating patriotic 
citizens” were repeatedly mentioned to highlight the idea of “support the leadership of Communist 
party, love the socialist motherland and support the unification of the nation and solidarity among 
nationalities” (MOE, 2000).  
However, as noted by Bulag (2002), the concept of “minzu tuanjie” (solidarity among nationalities) 
did not necessarily lead to strong social cohesion and an equal relationship between ethnic groups. 
Instead, since this “oneness” is largely defined by Han culture and its ideologies, the promotion of 
unity among ethnic groups inevitably resulted in a hegemonic power relationship between the 
Han-dominated nation-state and non-Han Chinese peoples, as arguably the welfare of the wider nation 
state was upheld at the expense of the minority ethnic groups. Under the rhetoric of “minzu tuanjie”, 
the minority ethnic groups’ demands for equality, cultural dignity, and autonomy were perceived as 
“futile, and jeopardizing”, both to the minority and to the Chinese nation, as claimed by the 
government (ibid, p.9). In other words, although in theory “minzu tuanjie” aimed to establish a 
harmonized relationship between ethnic groups, in reality it helped the state to establish a unified and 
even homogenized nation (ibid).  
  When non-Han Chinese do not accept and embrace this Han version of “Chineseness”, then the unity 
and legitimacy of the Chinese nation is seen to be challenged and threatened (He and Guo, 2000). 
Although, to counter this, the Chinese government has put enormous economic investment into 
Xinjiang (and into Tibet as well) in recent years, it seems that this approach to integration has not so far 
reduced resistance from minority ethnic groups, which has become even more intensive recently. 
 
The Paradox period (2008 - )  
  Since 2008, there has been series of ethnic clashes and so-called “terrorist attacks” across China, 
which has exposed the serious problem of ethnic relations in China
16
. The CPC government 
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 While the majority of the attacks took place in Xinjiang, some took place in other regions of China, e.g. Beijing 
the capital of PRC itself in October 2013 and Kunming in Southwest China in March 2014. The one in Beijing 
took place at the Tiananmen Square, a symbolic political center of the PRC. The one took place in Kunming 
involved knife-attack and caused more than 20 deaths with more than 100 people injured. Many Han Chinese were 
shocked by this attack because it happened in what they regarded as a “normal” city, rather than in cities in 
Xinjiang. 
immediately responded to these incidents by organizing several important conferences and issuing 
several significant policies and statements. The conference reports and the policies could be interpreted 
as signaling a shift of governing strategy in unstable minority ethnic regions – from “leap-forward 
development” (kuayueshi fazhan, which focused more on economic development) to “social stability” 
(shehui wending) (CHINA, 2014a). This adjustment had the implication that the major focus of the 
CPC’s governance in these regions in future would be on inter-ethnic relations as this would be the key 
to achieving social stability and social cohesion in such regions. One of the statements pointed out that 
there is a need to build a “mutually embedded social structure and community” where different ethnic 
groups are urged to work on “mutual understanding, mutual studying, mutual tolerance, mutual 
appreciation and mutual help” (Xinhua, 2014). The use of the word “mutually/mutual” here could be 




Education in particular has been seen as a priority in achieving social stability and cohesion in 
Xinjiang. Indeed, students from different ethnic backgrounds are now to be encouraged to “play 
together, study together and grow up together” (CHINA, 2014b). Similarly, during a visit to Xinjiang, 
President Xi specifically encouraged a Han teacher to learn the Uyghur language in order to teach the 
students better, an approach that goes beyond prevailing approaches bilingual education in Xinjiang in 
recent times. Meanwhile, previous education interventions, such as the bilingual education and in-land 
class system, have also experienced a further expansion since 2009. Bilingual education has now been 
expanded to kindergarten level and it was reported that more than 92% of minority ethnic children in 
Xinjiang are studying in bilingual kindergartens (MZB, 2013). The number of students enrolled in the 
Xinjiang in-land classes reached almost 10,000 in 2015, ten times more than the year 2000 when the 
program was launched (XJB, 2015).  
New education interventions were also introduced at local and central levels. In 2013, the CPC 
government decided to provide 12 years of free education for children in Kashgar in southern Xinjiang 
where Muslim Uyghur are the dominant inhabitants (also where many “terrorist attacks” took place), 
compared to only nine years in most parts of the country (China Daily, 2013, p.8). At the end of 2008 
(after the Tibet ethnic clash), the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE, 2008) issued a curriculum 
guideline to introduce a new school subject called “Education for Solidarity among Nationalities” 
(minzu tuanjie jiaoyu) to be taught in primary and secondary school across China. According to the 
guideline, the curriculum was to cover areas from basic knowledge about ethnic groups in China, such 
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 Moreover, the National Work Forum on Nationalities, which was held in September 2014, pointed out that any 
discrimination against minority ethnic groups should be strictly prohibited and corrected (PEOPLE, 2014). 
as their customs, festivals, cultures and heroes, etc., to more abstract and complex issues such as 
Marxist theories of ethnic relations and national policies on the issue
18
.  
While the above mentioned initiatives all show positive sign of movement towards a more equal 
ethnic relationship and generally reflect the spirit of multiculturalism, these encouraging shifts in 
political rhetorical have to be seen alongside reported crackdowns not only on alleged terrorist activity 
(BBC, 2014), but also on Uyghur cultural practices
19
 (Guardian, 2014a). Meanwhile, it seems that the 
CPC government believes the reason of rise of the “three powers” (sangu shili, i.e. the “terrorist”, the 
“separatist” and the “extremist”) in Xinjiang was due to weak awareness of national identity among 
minority ethnic groups (Leibold, 2013). Therefore, there has been an overwhelming emphasize on “a 
shared national identity” in government policies since then.  
As Dwyer (2005, p.30) pointed out, the “overarching national identity (Zhongguo ren, “person of 
China")” may reduce the cultural and linguistic diversity in China and eventually lead to assimilation 
of minority ethnic groups. It seems that the while, on the one hand, the current policies appear to 
promote equal ethnic relationships, on the other hand they can be seen to encourage the development of 
a mono-cultural and mono-lingual Chinese nation. Indeed, although there are a few signs of 
encouragement to Han Chinese to learn minority ethnic languages, bilingual education in Xinjiang still 
largely means minority ethnic groups learning Chinese
20
. The language of minority ethnic groups is 
further marginalized in the current educational developments, leading to a deterioration of minority 
student's skills in their mother tongue
21
.  
Similarly, the overwhelming focus on the “nation” may also lead to “suppression” or “dilution” of 
ethnic identities. Dwyer (2005, p.30) noted that there has been increasing use of a new non-ethnic 
identity, Xinjiang ren (“a person of Xinjiang”) in the media in these years. In fact, not only many Han 
                                                          
18
 It was reported that the knowledge of the new curriculum would be included in the “gaokao” (the national 
examination for university enrolment), which would definitely give the curriculum a significant status and 
encourage students to study it. 
19
 In May 2014, the Chinese government launched a year-long massive and rigorous nation-wide campaign to 
eradicate terrorism and within a month, in Xinjiang alone, the government reported that about 32 “terrorist groups” 
were destroyed and more than 380 suspects of “terrorists” were arrested (ChinaPeace, 2014). In addition, about 21 
so-called “illegal religious study centers” were closed (ibid). In September 2014, IIham Tohti, a former Uyghur 
lecturer at Minzu University, was jailed for life for advocating independence for his home province Xinjiang, even 
though his supporters insisted that he is a moderate critic (ABC News, 2014). In January 2015, the city of Urumqi, 
issued a regulation to prohibit the wearing of Islamic dress (jil bab) and veils (hijab) in public areas (PEOPLE, 
2015). All these measures constitute stricter regulation of ethnicity and religion at the current time. 
20
 It is suggested that the CPC government aims to implement the model of bilingual education which requires all 
school subjects taught through Mandarin except the subject of “Language and Literature” of their own language to 
all schools in Xinjiang in the future (Zhu, 2013). 
21
 This situation echoes Dwyer’s (2005, p.10) argument that “Establishing and fostering national unity required 
promoting Standard Mandarin Chinese to a dominant position at the expense of all other languages, including 
other varieties of Chinese”. 
Chinese in the region now call themselves “Xinjiang ren”, but “the large increases in the Xinjiang Han 
population over the last decade have been prompted debates over whether the ethnonym Uyghur should 
be deleted from the administrative toponym ‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’” (ibid). Moreover, 
in their reform proposals for ethnic issues, two prominent scholars, Ma Rong and Hu Angang
22
, 
advocated the idea of weakening ethnic identity or consciousness and replacing it with “a collective 
sense of national belonging” (Ma, 2009, cited in Leibold, 2013, p.18) or “a shared sense of civic 
belonging” (Hu & Hu, 2011, cited in Leibold, 2013, p.21) - both aiming to dilute or remove 
ethno-cultural identity in future.  
This tendency, compared to policies which encourage a more multicultural spirit and equal ethnic 
relationship, reflects the paradoxical nature of current Chinese governance in minority ethnic regions 
such as Xinjiang
23
. As the current policies are still at their early stage of implementation, it is too early 
to conclude whether these various policies will pan out and articulate with each other. However, as 
Leibold and Chen (2014) have pointed out, neither the encouragement of inter-ethnic contact nor the 
promotion of a shared national identity “address the underlying yet chronic racism in Chinese society”. 
Indeed, unless such issues of institutional discrimination and inequality within the assumed national 
framework are widely acknowledged and tackled, the tension within the paradoxical policies will not 
be resolved easily in future.  
  
Conclusion  
This chapter has briefly examined policy changes in minority education in China and how the 
changes responded to wider shifts in the political climate. The case of Xinjiang was particularly 
discussed as an example of policy intervention in one of China's most multi-ethnic regions. This 
demonstrated that the Chinese central government had adopted various ways to integrate its minority 
ethnic population in different periods. Although in some periods education policies (e.g. language 
instruction and school choice) tended to embrace the spirit of pluralism and multiculturalism, these 
policies have themselves not necessarily guaranteed equal ethnic relations and educational equality
24
.  
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 Ma Rong is a professor of Peking University and a leading scholar in ethnic relations in China. He has been 
appealing for ethnic-policy reform for a long period of time but, after the recent series of ethnic clashes, his 
“once-marginal views are now part of the mainstream conversation with a wide range of academic, policymakers, 
and other thinkers (across ethnic and ideological spectrums) sharing his concerns with the current approach” 
(Leibold, 2013, p.xii). Hu Angang is the founding director of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies at 
Tsinghua University, one of China’s most influential think tanks. He called for a “second generation of ethnic 
policies” which has triggered fierce debates about this issue. 
23
 It should be noted that policies adopted in previous periods also sometimes had the problem of being 
contradictory. But it is after 2008 that their paradoxical nature becomes so apparent, as shown in this section. 
24
 Law (2012, p.59) also concluded that Chinese minority ethnic education policies merely recruit “ethnic cadres” 
to support a strategy of “racial sinicization”. Dwyer (2005) regard bilingual education in China as really 
As we have tried to demonstrate, at the core of the problem is the challenge of achieving an 
appropriate balance between “unity and diversity”
25
. Other scholars too have suggested that 
long-standing tensions between various discourses about national and ethnic identity have not really 
been resolved in contemporary official discourse. Indeed, while China has long been claiming itself as 
“unitary multi-ethnic nation” (tongyi de duominzu guojia), “diversity” has often been seen as 
potentially threatening to the concept of Chinese nationhood (Dwyer, 2005, pp.30-31). Under the 
rhetoric of Chinese nationalism, “reducing hundreds of ethnic histories, identities, and languages to the 
same simple categories and trajectories was seen by the new central government as crucial in building 
national unity”(ibid, p.21). 
When this focus on nationhood and the whole process of “nationalizing” merges with the culture 
and ideology of the dominant Han group, there is a risk of “great Han Chauvinism” (da Hanzu zhuyi) 
which heavily promotes Han cultural assimilation (or Sinicization) and therefore seriously damages 
ethnic and cultural diversity in China (Gladney, 1988, pp.226-227).  
Therefore, we would argue that there is an urgent need to re-think “Chineseness”, so that the current 
Han dominant vision of China can be replaced with a new vision of multi-ethnic China. Indeed, it is 
difficult to envisage genuine education equality among different ethnic groups happening in schools on 
any significant scale in the absence of wider changes in Chinese society, as it is the wider conception of 
citizenship in a society that largely defines the nature of nationhood and the position of minority ethnic 
groups in the national framework. As mentioned before, the CPC established the PRC on the basis of a 
civic Chinese citizenship predicated on the acceptance of Communist ideology rather than on ethnic 
background. In theory, then, the Chinese government is anti-racist and promotes equality between 
ethnic groups in China. This is the doctrine of the 56 nationalities that comprise the Chinese people.  
However, some researchers maintain that, in practice, there are elements of racism evident in 
contemporary Chinese society (Dikötter, 1992; Law, 2012). According to Law (2012), minority ethnic 
groups such as the Uyghur and Tibetan peoples suffer from institutional racism. He suggests that the 
social system in China is Han-centric and that minority ethnic groups are not only culturally 
marginalized, but are also discriminated against economically and politically. It is therefore necessary 
for scholars and policy makers to address these wider structural issues and understand better how they 
affect education.  
  Although it has sometimes been objected by Chinese politicians that racism itself is a Western 
concept (Dikötter, 1992), building a “unitary multi-ethnic” China must surely involve discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
monolingual education in Mandarin Chinese and the in-land classes as essentially assimilationist in effect. 
Therefore, these policies certainly do not seem to have yet been successful in overcoming inter-ethnic tensions in 
the region, as evidenced in recent alleged “terror attacks” in Xinjiang itself and other cities in China. 
25
 A recent western book on minority education in China (Leibold and Chen, 2014), echoes some of the themes of 
our chapter. Its sub-title also recognizes that one of the biggest challenges in education for diverse groups within a 
nation is getting an appropriate balance between “unity and diversity in an era of critical pluralism”. 
apparently “racial” differences, whatever their provenance. It is noted that there has been no 
distinctively anti-racist phase in policies with regard to minority ethnic education in China
26
. Nor has 
there so far been much evidence of the influence of critical race theory within Chinese educational 
studies. This approach, which originated in the USA, recognizes the prevalence of racial inequality in 
society and seeks to demonstrate the way in which racial inequality is maintained through the operation 
of structures and assumptions that appear normal and unremarkable (Rollock and Gillborn, 2011).  
  In various parts of the world, discussion of such matters in educational studies and teacher education 
courses has facilitated a greater awareness of the extent to which the education of diverse ethnic groups 
is a challenge not just to those involved in the education of minority ethnic students themselves but also 
those involved in the education of the dominant group in society (Gaine, 1987), in this case the Han 
majority. In the Chinese context, this means that changes need to take place not only in the education of 
minority ethnic groups, nor even just in the education of all nationalities in Xinjiang, but also in the 
education of students of all nationalities throughout China. Only when this is recognized are genuinely 
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